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INTRODUCTION
Beyond Conjugality, the report of the Law Commission of Canada on close personal
relationships among adults,1 is an important document for the future of federal and
provincial legislation for which such relationships are relevant. Affirming as fundamental values both the equal recognition of different types of relationships and
individual autonomy regarding the kinds of relationships entered into, the report
rejects the traditional reliance on conjugality as a key criterion for legal regulation,
favouring instead a functional approach attuned to the specific policies pursued for
different legal purposes.
The report reviews a number of federal statutes in which legal consequences
turn on specific kinds of relationships among adults, and it proposes a new methodology for assessing existing or proposed legal rules that employ relational terms
in order to accomplish their objectives.2 According to this methodology, lawmakers
should ask the following four questions:
1. Are the objectives of the legal rule legitimate?
2. If the rule’s objectives are sound, are close personal relationships among
adults relevant to these objectives?
3. If close personal relationships among adults are relevant to the rule’s objectives, can individuals be allowed to designate the relevant relationships
themselves?
4. If relationships matter and self-designation is neither feasible nor appropriate,
can the rule be revised to better reflect the kinds of relationships that are
relevant to its objectives?
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Where the legal rule fails the first of these tests, according to the report, it should
be repealed or fundamentally revised. Where it satisfies the first test but fails the
second, it should be revised to remove unnecessary relational references.3 Where
the rule satisfies the third test, it should be revised to permit self-designation of the
included relationships.4 Where self-designation is neither feasible nor appropriate,
the final step encourages lawmakers to devise functional definitions of the relationships that more accurately target the specific legislative objectives.5
Applying this fourfold methodology to the federal Income Tax Act,6 the report
concludes
■
■
■

■

■

that the individual should remain the basic unit for the personal income tax,7
that the tax credit for spouses and common law partners should be repealed, 8
that the goods and services tax (GST) credit should disregard close adult
relationships altogether,9
that tax credits for caregivers and infirm dependants should be available
regardless of conjugal or blood relationship whenever taxpayers provide
unpaid caregiving or financial support,10 and
that rollover provisions should be made available to all persons “living together in economically interdependent relationships.”11

In order to arrive at these conclusions, the report conducts a careful analysis of
each of these aspects of the income tax, addressing tax and broader public policy
considerations in an impressively concise and readable form.
In this comment, I do not question the report’s general conclusion that federal
legislation should look beyond conjugality to recognize the diversity of personal
relationships among adults, or the proposed methodology for evaluating legal rules
that employ relational terms. Indeed, I endorse the report’s affirmation of relational
equality and individual autonomy as fundamental values that should guide federal
and provincial legislative reform. I also do not question the report’s persuasive case
for the individual as the basic unit for the personal income tax on the grounds that
■

■

■

individual taxation is simpler to administer and more respectful of personal
privacy and autonomy than is taxation based on conjugal or family units;
individual taxation has a less distorting effect on individual decisions to enter
into relationships and to participate in the paid labour force than does
taxation of other units; and
individual taxation best corresponds to the purpose and structure of the
income tax by applying to income over which individuals exercise effective
control, rather than income from which they may derive some benefit.12

It is beyond the scope of this brief comment to examine each of the report’s
proposed amendments to the ITA. Instead, I shall address what I consider to be the
most significant recommendations: that the tax credit for spouses and common law
partners should be repealed and that the GST credit should be fully individualized.
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Questioning both of these recommendations, I draw some general conclusions on
the report’s vision of close personal relationships among adults, at least as these
affect issues of income taxation and support.

THE TA X CREDIT FOR SPOUSE S AND
COMMON LAW PARTNERS
Traditionally available only for a married person supporting a spouse, the tax credit
for spouses and common law partners was extended in 1993 to persons of the
opposite sex cohabiting in a conjugal relationship,13 and in 2000 to cohabiting gay
and lesbian partners.14 For the 2001 taxation year, the credit increased the basic
personal amount of $7,412 by an amount equal to $6,294 less the spouse’s or
common law partner’s income for the year above $629.15 As the maximum additional amount allowed under this provision is less than the basic personal amount
that would be available to an income-earning spouse or common law partner, some
have argued that the credit discriminates against single-income couples.16 Canadian
legal academics, however, have generally criticized the credit as an unwarranted
subsidy for single-income couples, which encourages economic dependency among
stay-at-home partners (who are generally women) by discouraging their participation in the paid labour force.17 Beyond Conjugality adopts the latter view.
Consistent with its proposed methodology, the report evaluates the credit for
spouses and common law partners by first asking whether the provision fulfills a
legitimate objective within the structure of the income tax. For this purpose, it
considers both “technical” tax policy criteria like equity, neutrality, and simplicity,
and “tax expenditure” justifications involving other public policy objectives pursued through the income tax.18
Beginning with technical tax policy considerations, the report rejects the argument that the credit recognizes the reduced ability to pay of a taxpayer who
supports a spouse or common law partner with little or no income. It states:
[I]ndividuals who enter into relationships in which they choose to support other
individuals capable of supporting themselves do not have reduced ability to pay, as
this term is understood in tax policy analysis.19

In addition, the report suggests:
Far from reducing the ability to pay of the partner working in the paid working force,
supporting a partner who works in the home will often increase the working partner’s
ability to pay because it will substantially reduce the services they will have to purchase
in the marketplace.20

Moreover, the credit “provides an incentive for one spouse or common-law partner
to remain economically dependent on the other” by decreasing as the income of
the “dependent” spouse or common law partner increases, thereby in effect taxing
income that would otherwise be exempt under the “dependant’s” basic personal
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amount.21 As a result, the report concludes, the credit contradicts technical tax
policy criteria of equity and neutrality.
The report also argues that the credit cannot be defended as a legitimate tax
expenditure providing “income support to those families in which one spouse is
looking after children in the home or acting as a caregiver for elderly parents,” 22
since it does not depend on such caregiving and is given to the supporting spouse
or common law partner rather than to the caregiver or those in need of care. As a
result, the report concludes, the credit does not pass the first of the commission’s
four tests: “it is a law that employs relational terms but does not serve a legitimate
government objective—and should, therefore, be repealed.” 23
While I agree with the commission’s conclusion that the tax credit for spouses
and common law partners cannot be justified as a reasonable tax expenditure to
support caregiving for children or elderly parents, I question its view that the
credit contradicts the “technical” tax criterion of equitable taxation according to
ability to pay. Moreover, the argument that the credit encourages economic dependency is not sufficiently supported to outweigh equitable considerations that
might justify its retention. Indeed, the commission’s own emphasis on recognizing
different kinds of close personal relationships among adults might favour something like the credit for spouses and common law partners and other tax measures
to ensure relational equality.
Beginning with the criterion of ability to pay, it is not obvious that individuals
who support a spouse or common law partner with little or no income “do not,” as
the report concludes, “have reduced ability to pay, as this term is understood in tax
policy analysis.” 24 On the contrary, to the extent that support obligations are
mandated under provincial family law regimes, basic costs associated with these
obligations appear to constitute involuntary expenses that reduce the supporting
person’s ability to pay. Nor does the possibility that supported persons may be
“capable of supporting themselves” 25 necessarily undo the involuntariness of the
support obligation, since the supported person’s “choice” to earn little or no income
is not always voluntary.26 Further, the initial choice to enter into a close personal
relationship should not outweigh the involuntariness of a subsequent support
obligation, so long as these relationships are regarded as a social norm that (as the
subtitle of the report itself suggests) legal rules are intended to recognize and
support. Finally, the value of any household services should not enter into the
supporting person’s “ability to pay,” since “imputed income” is consistently ignored
in defining the income tax base and is rightly ignored in any tax that respects
personal autonomy.27 In any event, there is no assurance that a spouse or common
law partner with little or no income necessarily performs any more household
services than an income-earning spouse or common law partner with respect to
whom the credit cannot be claimed.28
As for the argument that the credit discourages supported spouses or common
law partners from participating in the paid labour force, the magnitude of any
effect is likely quite small, as the report itself acknowledges.29 Indeed, while the
credit is reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis as the supported individual’s income
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increases from $629 to $6,294, it is unaffected thereafter, creating a combined
effective tax rate of nil not only on the first $629 earned by the supported individual but also on income between $6,294 and $7,412. The report does not cite
any empirical study that has attempted to measure this effect of the credit on
participation in the paid labour force. As a result, where a credit for spouses and
common law partners can be supported on equitable grounds, it should not be
rejected on the basis of its alleged impact on personal decisions.
In addition to these considerations, the commission’s emphasis on relational equality provides further justification for a credit and other tax measures recognizing
support obligations and economic mutuality among economically interdependent
adults. Where a supported spouse or common law partner cares for children, for
example, a credit provides at least some recognition for the economic value of
these services, which do not currently qualify for the child-care expense deduction.
Indeed, to the extent that child care is a joint responsibility of both parents, which
may be fulfilled by third-party providers or by a division of labour in which one
parent becomes the primary caregiver, I have argued elsewhere that the child-care
expense deduction should respect these different choices by permitting one parent
to deduct payments to the other up to the maximum amounts allowed by the
deduction.30 Better than a credit for “supporting” individuals, such a reform would
explicitly recognize the economic value of these child-care services, enable
caregivers to claim the basic personal amount themselves, and lessen their economic dependence on partners participating in the paid labour force. It would also
further relational equality by recognizing the diversity of child-care arrangements
in which parents choose to engage.
Whether a credit for spouses and common law partners is ultimately justifiable
under the commission’s fourfold methodology depends not only on whether it
serves a legitimate purpose in the income tax but also on whether close personal
relationships are relevant to this purpose, whether individuals may be permitted to
designate the relevant relationships themselves, and whether recognition of alternative relationships might better serve the legislative purpose. Without examining
these questions in detail, one might reasonably conclude that self-designation is
inappropriate31 but that the credit should be available for any relationship in which
support obligations are mandated by law. While the specification of these relationships is itself a matter of normative debate, this debate involves matters of family
law and is beyond the scope of this comment.

THE GST CREDIT
The GST credit is a refundable tax credit, enacted when the federal GST was
introduced in 1990 and intended to offset the regressivity of this consumption tax
by providing quarterly payments to low-income Canadians. For 2001, the credit
pays a maximum annual amount of $205 for each individual plus an additional
amount up to $107 for individuals without a cohabiting spouse or common law
partner.32 Where the individual’s “adjusted income” exceeds $26,284, the amount of
the credit is phased out at a rate of 5 percent for each dollar above this threshold.33
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The term “adjusted income” is generally defined as the combined income of the
individual and the individual’s spouse or common law partner.34 As a result, the
amount of the credit depends on conjugal relationships in two ways: determining
the maximum amount that an individual may obtain, and computing any reduction
in this amount where the individual’s “adjusted income” exceeds the dollar threshold.
The traditional justification for these references to conjugal relationships is
twofold. With respect to the maximum amount of the credit, the lesser amount for
cohabiting spouses and common law partners reflects the assumption that “by
living together in such a relationship the individuals will realize economies in
household production and consumption that will result in a higher standard of
living for each.” 35 The reduction in this amount based on the individual’s “adjusted
income,” on the other hand, reflects the empirical assumption that a low-income
individual is “not likely to be in need” if accommodation is shared with a spouse or
common law partner with sufficient income,36 and a normative judgment that the
primary obligation to support a cohabiting spouse or common law partner with
little or no income rests on the other spouse or common law partner, not on the
state. Notwithstanding these arguments, the commission opposes any reference to
conjugal relationships in the GST credit, recommending that the computation of
the credit should be completely individualized.
Beginning with the maximum amount of the credit, the report offers three
reasons why it should not be reduced for cohabiting spouses and common law
partners. First, it explains, “the validity of the factual assumption that there are
consumption economies when two individuals cohabit in a conjugal relationship is
at best questionable.” 37 On the contrary, it observes:
[S]ome individuals who enter into personal relationships might have been living with
others, such as parents or roommates, before the relationship. For these individuals,
cohabiting with another individual in a conjugal relationship might result in a loss of
consumption economies. For other individuals, cohabiting with someone in a conjugal relationship might involve moving out of a single-bedroom apartment and into a
two-bedroom apartment or even a house. For these individuals, consumption economies are likely to be small or nonexistent.38

Second, the report continues, even if cohabiting individuals require fewer resources to attain the same level of economic welfare as persons living alone, the
realization of these economies should not be penalized through the tax and transfer
system.39 Indeed, since economies can also be achieved “by buying goods in bulk,
sharing consumer durables or car pooling, for example,” 40 the commission considers it questionable to single out economies attributable to cohabitation for special
treatment. Third, the report emphasizes, even if such economies exist and should
be taken into account in computing government transfer payments, “conjugal
cohabitation has become an increasingly poor proxy for the identification of such
economies.” 41 Since non-conjugal co-residents retain any economies of scale from
these arrangements, the report concludes, the GST credit discriminates against
conjugal relationships.
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With respect to the phaseout based on the combined income of spouses or
common law partners, the report is somewhat less definitive. On the one hand, it
observes, “it is not inconsistent for a control-based tax system to be based on
individuals, while a needs-based income support program would combine the
income of individuals who live together in interdependent relationships.” 42 On the
other hand, it continues, there are three reasons why individualization might be
preferred. First, by reducing the credit for cohabiting couples, “the use of . . .
combined income . . . in determining eligibility for income-tested benefits creates
troubling disincentives” to the formation of conjugal relationships.43 Second, by
supporting low-income individuals regardless of the income of their spouse or
common law partner, “an individual income test promotes autonomy and gender
equality . . . [r]educing women’s economic dependence” on spouses or common law
partners.44 Finally, to the extent that the combined income test is designed to measure
the individual’s economic well-being, the use of conjugality is a questionable proxy
and the definition of other relationships is difficult to determine.45 On balance,
therefore, the report finds the case for individual income testing “compelling.” 46
While I agree with the report’s critique of reductions in the maximum amount
of the GST credit for cohabiting spouses and common law partners, I am not
convinced that the income phaseout should depend on individual income alone.
Although the use of combined income can impose a financial penalty on the formation of conjugal relationships,47 this cost is not substantial and may be outweighed
by economies resulting from shared accommodation.48 Although the report cites
no empirical studies on the magnitude of any effect, US studies on the much
greater impact of joint filing suggest that these financial costs affect only the
timing of marriages, not the marriage rate itself.49 Moreover, the GST credit, which
provides a maximum annual benefit of $312, cannot do much to promote autonomy and gender equality. These goals are more likely to be advanced through
other tax and public policy measures, such as the repeal of income attribution rules
for spouses and common law partners,50 and the amendment of the child-care
expense deduction to permit one parent to deduct payments to the other up to
the maximum amounts allowed by the deduction.51 Finally, it is not impossible to
define the relevant range of relationships for which incomes should be combined for
the purposes of a phaseout, where the purpose of this combination reflects a
normative judgment that the primary support obligation rests with one or more
individuals rather than the state. For this purpose, however, as with the credit for
spouses and common law partners examined earlier, it is necessary to refer to
family law.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
For a report that affirms the recognition and support of close personal adult
relationships as “an important state objective,” 52 it might seem odd that the two
most significant tax reform proposals disregard these relationships altogether, recommending that the tax credit for spouses and common law partners be repealed
and that the GST credit be fully individualized. As the discussion in this comment
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suggests, however, these recommendations reflect the commission’s vision of close
personal adult relationships as freely chosen by autonomous individuals whose
rights and obligations relate mainly to the state rather than to one another. An
alternative view is that close personal adult relationships are inevitably interdependent, creating mutual rights and obligations that are rightly taken into account
in defining each individual’s rights and obligations vis-à-vis the state. Given my
objections to the commission’s recommendations regarding the tax credit for
spouses and common law partners and the GST credit, I suppose that I find the
latter vision more attractive than the former.
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